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RADIO PROGRAM CONTROLS: A NETWORK
OF INADEQUACY
" [Tihe troubles of representative government . . . go back
to a common source: to the failure of self-governing people to trans-
cend their casual experience and their prejudice, by inventing,
creating, and organizing a machinery of knowledge." t
RADIo broadcasting is unique among the media of mass communication
in that, while the reach of its facilities is unsurpassed,' their number is
limited ultimately by the finite nature of the broadcast spectrum - and not
by the availability of finance capital.3 Conditioned in its every aspect by
this physical circumscription, national policy toward radio 4 has abandoned
the theoretically free competition guaranteed other vehicles of expression 11
and has established a licensing system restricting the number of stations,
tNVATE Lipp-mAN, PUBLIC OpiNiox 364-5 (1922).
1. Ninety-eight per cent of the people of the United States are within range of at
least one of the more than 1400 operating or authorized stations, WnrrE, TiE Atox-
CAN RAnio 204 (1947), while approximately four-fifths of the country's homes, it may be
estimated, are equipped with radios. SIXTEENTH CENSUS, HousINo, Vol. I1, pt. I, p. 28
(1943). The picture is darkened by the fact that 5,575 of the cities of 1,000 or more
population have no local stations and, accordingly, can receive only programs broadcast to
extensive areas and not aimed at the needs of particular localities. While frequency
modulation (FM) makes technically possible indigenous coverage of these communities,
construction expense forces the prediction that most small towns will continue to receive
only outside treatment of local news. See WHITE, op. cit. supra, at 205-6.
2. FCC, RADio, A PUBLIC Pai PM (1940). This is true, of course, only of the
current state of scientific knowledge. Development of FMi has made possible, through
exploitation of a hitherto unused band, at least four times the existing number of sta-
tions. SIEPMANN, RADIO'S SECOND CHANCE 240 (1947). Either through further ex-
pansion of the utilizable portions of the broadcast spectrum or by the discovery of means
of transmitting a number of signals on one frequency, it is quite possible that so many
channels will become available that only technical controls vill be necessary to prevent
accidental over-lapping, thus resolving the problem of this comment. See Co~msslo.; o.
FPREEoM OF THE PREss, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PREss 33 (1947).
3. This is scarcely to suggest that the problem of securing capital does not inhibit
the development of new stations. A recent FCC estimate indicated $34,107 as the
average initial outlay involved in establishing a local station in a community under
50,000 population and $133,000 for a regional station in a larger city. N.Y. Times, Nov.
4, 1947, p. 37, col. 6.
4. For discussion of radio regulation in other countries, see HuTir, RADIo ToDAY
(1942); TUNER, FBEE SPzaCH AND BrO.4CmASTING (1943).
5. While the individual is guaranteed freedom of expression against either federal
or state interference, U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. I, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931),
the protection seemingly covers only his voiced sentiments unless he possesses $25,M00-
$100,000 to establish a small-town newspaper, five to ten million dollars for a metropoli-
tan daily, two or three million for a mass market magazine or $100,000 for a feature mo-
tion picture or a book publishing house. See Commiss0 o oN FREEDom or TiE PrEss,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 50.
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their power and position in the spectrum, to the end that those on the air
may operate with maximum efficiency.6
Underlying these regulations is the thesis that radio's enormous potential-
ities are to be used in the public interest. Accordingly, there has developed
simultaneously with the technical restrictions a correlative system of con-
trols intended to insure that holders of the privilege of broadcasting exercise
their franchise in the manner most beneficial to the public welfare, that the
programs aired are those which best exploit radio's capabilities. Unlike the
technological regulatory power, which is centralized in the government's
supervisory agency,7 the Federal Communications Commission,8 program
content controls are distributed. Basically, the split is between the FCC
6. Currently embodied in the Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934),
47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1940), federal regulation of commercial radio began shortly
after the first successful scheduled transmission of speech by radio in 1919, the Secretary
of Commerce claiming authority under the Radio Act of 1912, 37 STAT. 302 (1912), to
assign frequencies, hours and power maxima to broadcasters. In 1926, however, the as-
serted mandate was judicially denied. United States v. Zenith, 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926) ;
cf. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 Fed. 1003 (App. D.C. 1993) ; 35 Ops. ATTy G N. 126
(1926). Almost immediately, the flimsy control structure collapsed, At the time of the
enactment of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1162, source of the present control struc-
ture, of the 733 stations operating on 90 channels, 129 were off their channels, 41 were
operating on Canadian frequencies and virtually all were ignoring power and time re-
strictions. RoBINsoN, RADIo NrrwORKS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 51 (1943);
WHITE, op. cit. .supra note 1, at 134.
7. Broadcasting is interstate commerce within the control of Congress when the
radius of transmission extends beyond state lines, United States v. American Bond &
Mortgage Co., 31 F.2d 448 (N.D.Ill. 1929), aff'd, 52 F.2d 318 (C.C.A. 7th 1931), cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 538 (1932) ; cf. Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S.
650 (1936). State statutes are unconstitutional insofar as they attempt to regulate
broadcasting whose effect crosses state boundaries. National Broadcasting Co. v. Board
of Public Utility Comm'rs of New Jersey, 25 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1938). Under these
decisions, state regulation of amplitude modulation (AM or standard) broadcasting
stations is barred, for it is impossible to transmit via AM without the waves crossing
state lines; an interesting problem may arise should the states, under existing statutes,
attempt to regulate television or FM broadcasting whose maximum range falls well
within the borders of many states. See N.J. Rzv. STAT., tit. 48, c. 11 (1937), Mici.
ComP. L. §11726 et seq. (1929). Michigan apparently contemplates no action under its
statute. Communication to the Yale Law Journal from the Michigan Public Service
Commission, Sept. 10, 1947. But a bill has been presented to the Ohio Legislature sub-
jecting all television broadcasts to approval by the state Educational Department, an
agency currently charged with censorship of films. WHiTE, op. cit. supra note 1, at
126 n. 1. A rationale for defeating this control is suggested in United States v. Gregg,
5 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.Tex. 1934) (AM station must be federally licensed despite fact its
signals not audible beyond state boundaries on ground of interference with incoming
signals).
8. The Commission is composed of seven members-no more than four of whom
may be members of the same. political party-appointed for terms of seven years by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Communications Act of 1934, §4,
48 STAT. 1066 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1940) (hereinafter cited by section only).
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and the broadcaster, the former having an over-all mandate under the Com-
munications Act of 1934 to administer the ether as "public convenience, in-
terest, or necessity requires," 9 and the latter being charged with the respon-
sibility of exercising in the public interest the privilege of which he is trustee.
In the listening public itself is the ultimate, if largely untapped, power of
program determination through expression of its demands. These program
content controls, all of which raise problems peculiar to radio, are the sub-
ject of this discussion. Other restraints exist, imposed by the trademark,"
copyright," defamation 12 and fair trade 13 laws, but inasmuch as the ques-
tions they pose are common to all media of mass communication they will
not here be treated.
FEDERAL CONTROL
The Statutory Dilemma
In the Communications Act of 1934,14 substantially a re-enactment of the
Radio Act of 1927,' 5 all radio channels are declared to be public property,
available to private users for limited periods only. 10 The FCC is authorized
to license stations applying for use of broadcast frequencies whenever the
"public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby," 17 a for-
9. Section 303. For a study of the objectives and effectiveness of governmental
regulation of content, see Note, Govensment Control of the Content of Radio Programs, 47
COL L. REv. 1041 (1947).
10. See 2 SocoLow, THE LAw OF RADIO BRO.caSTMG 916-50 (1939).
11. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et scq.
(1940). See discussion 2 SocoLow, op. cit. supra note 10, at 1036-1221.
12. As might have been anticipated from the confused nature of the defamation laws,
Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of Slander and Libel, 36 Am. L. REV. 552 (1902),
the courts have experienced serious difficulty in determining whether broadcast defama-
tion is libel, Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 NAV. 82 (1932), ef. Hartmann V.
Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E2d 30 (1947), or slander, Summit Hotel Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939); and whether the station owner is
liable, Sorenson v. Wood, supra, or not, Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co.,
179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942). See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50
HARv. L. REV. 725, 729-31 (1937); Vold, The Basis for Liability for Dcfamation by
Radio, 19 M fr. L. REv. 611 (1935). In any event, most large stations retain lawyer-
censors to avoid defamation suits. FRosr, Is ammCA, RADio D~mocnATrc? 72-9 (1937).
13. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §41
et seq. (1940). In the fiscal year 1946, the FTC scrutinized 1,186,724 pages of commer-
cial broadcast continuity for violations of the Act. RF.'. FTC 62 (1946). See 2 SocoLow,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 968-1004.
14. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 ct seq. (1940).
15. 44 STAT. 1162 (1927). The 1927 statute embraced radio alone; the Communications
Act of 1934 entrusted the Commission with regulation of telephone and telegraph service as
well.
16. Section 301.
17. Section 307. Licenses are granted for three-year periods, 47 CoDz Fr. REcs.
§3.34 (1943 Supp.), upon written application stating the frequency, power and time re-
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mula neither defined by the statute nor given meaningful judicial construc-
tion. 8
Accordingly, in cases where applicants of equal technical and financial
standing apply for the same frequency, the Commission has felt compelled
to employ program content as a determinant of desirability; ID by extension,
the Commission has held that program content presented or proposed must
be "in the public interest" for the application to be granted. 0 Whether im-
posed prior or subsequent to transmission of programs, such consideration
is a form of censorship. But the Commission is forced to deny that it exer-
cises censorial authority, for Section 326 of the Act categorically withholds
any such power and forbids the FCC to "interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication." 21 Attempting to reconcile these
quested and the purposes for which the station is to be used, § 308(b). Upon examination
of the application, the FCC may issue a license; should the application fail to justify
licensing, the Commission is required to hold hearings before making final determination,
§ 309. From any final action of the FCC, aggrieved parties may appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and therefrom to the Supreme Court on certiorari,
the courts' jurisdiction being confined to matters of law unless it appears that the regula-
tory agency's action has been arbitrary or capricious, § 402.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to interfere with the regulatory process. See
FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 67 Sup. Ct. 213 (1946); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) ; Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U.S. 146 (1940) ; FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); and FRC v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266
(1933). But see Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) ; FCC v. National
Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239 (1943) ; FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940).
18. "The 'public interest' to be served . . . is . . . the interest of the listening public."
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943). Certain defi-
nite restraints on program content, however, do appear in the statute. Transmission of
obscene, indecent or profane language, and information concerning lotteries or similar
games of chance is banned, §§ 326, 316. WRBL Radio Station, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 687, 691
(1936). Maximum criminal punishment for violation of any of the Act's prohibitions is a
fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, § 501.
Affirmatively, the Act requires that program sponsors be identified, § 317, and that
should the use of a licensee's facilities be extended to a candidate for political office, equal
opportunity be afforded to rival office-seekers, § 315. The licensee is denied censorial
powers over material broadcast under this latter section but is not affirmatively obliged to
offer his facilities to any candidate.
19. WBNX Broadcasting Co., Proposed Decision, FCC Docket No. 6013, April 15,
1947; Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 5 F.C.C. 501 (1938); Southwest Broadcasting
Co., 3 F.C.C. 630, 635 (1937). "If the criterion of 'public interest' were limited to such
matters, how could the Commission choose between two applicants for tile same facilities,
each of whom is financially and technically qualified to operate a station?" National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-7 (1943).
20. Pacific Radio Corp., 6 F.C.C. 475 (1938); Carl S. Taylor, 3 F.C.C. 281 (1936).
21. Section 326. A questionable solution to the dilemma has been offered by Senator
White (R., Me.) in S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1947), which would amend § 326
to read that "the Commission shall have no power to censor . . . the substance of any
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contradictory mandates, the Commission has denied licenses to applicants
and revoked existing franchises on the ground of failure to satisfy the re-
quirements of the public interest but has always considered over-all service
as a basis for such action rather than any particular program.
Assertion by the FCC of power to regulate program content has drawn
repeated attack, based on the contention that it is the intent of the Commun-
ications Act to permit as much freedom of expression on the air as the avail-
able frequencies will allow and that circumscription of this freedom is vio-
lative of the guarantees of the First Amendment.
2 2
This rationale seemingly fails to appreciate the premise underlying the
First Amendment, that truth can be discovered only through "free trade in
ideas" 23 in a free market place.24 Knowledge of the truth can scarcely be
measured by the possession of funds sufficient to construct radio stations.
When there is added the further consideration that a broadcasting license
is an exclusionary privilege, the argument for permitting that franchise to
material to be broadcast by any radio broadcast station ... : Protided, That nothing
herein contained shall be construed to limit the authority of the Commission in its con-
sideration of applications for renewal of licenses to determine whether or not the licensee
has operated in the public interest." At Senator Whites request, the bill has not been
reported out of committee. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1947, p. 16, col. 8.
22. See, e.g., MILLEP, TaE BLUE BooK 11 (1947); Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and
Radio Broadcasting, 177 ANNArs 179 (1935); Dawson, Censorship on the Air, 31 Am.
MEnctnvy 257, 261 (1934) ; N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1931, p. 36, col. 3.
In the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, there is some slight evidence to
support the thesis that Congress would, at that time, have been reluctant to adopt the
FCC's interpretation of the anti-censorship provisions; see, e.g., 67 Co.=. REc. 5480,
12615 (1926); Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and Radio Broadcasting, 177 Aaz,.iAs 179,
184-8 (1935). But see Note, 46 HAuv. L. REv. 987 (1933). Certainly an equally possible
explanation is that Congress failed, in its rush to enact legislation, to consider the rami-
fications of the problem. Moreover, on reconsideration in 1934, the essential provisions of
the statute were not changed although the FRC had long since enunciated its interpreta-
tion of § 326. 2 FRC ANN. REP. 160 (1928).
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the point. Dicta in FCC v. Sanders Bros., 309
U.S. 470, 475 (1940), support the claim that the Commission may not consider program
content, but are seemingly outweighed by more persuasive statements. See, e.g., Justice
Frankdurter in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-7 (1943):
the Commission has "the burden of determining the composition of the traffic" and its
"licensing function cannot be discharged . . . merely by finding that there are no technical
objections to the granting of a license." Cf. FRC v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 235
(1933).
23. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919). And for one of the classical sources of the thesis, see Mmwro:, Areopagiica
(1644) in JoHNq MiL-rON, ComPn'Em Posmy AND Smtxcrn Paosn 677, 719 (Mod. Lib.
Ed. 1942).
24. For a skillful expansion of this theme, see Letter of Dr. Alexander Pekelis, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 27, 1946, p. 24, cols. 1-2, replying to an allegation by Arthur Krock that the
FCC, in the News case, see pp. 283--6 infra, was exceeding its authority. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 15, 1946, p. 22, col. 5.
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be utilized at the will of individuals appears untenable. It is hardly debat-
able that government regulation of the media of communication should be
kept at a minimum. But intervention in radio is mandatory. Accordingly,
it seems far more advisable to attempt, through regulation, to secure the
widest circulation of contending ideas,' fine entertainment,25 and maximum
service in public, rather than private, interest, than to urge minimized inter-
vention in the name of the very freedom reduced regulation would subvert.
Acting to fulfill its duty thus conceived, the FCC has adopted three meth-
ods: first, by barring the air to certain classes of applicants, it has assured
that programs likely to be broadcast by them will not be transmitted; second,
it has stigmatized various classes of programs as not in the public interest;
and, finally, it has affirmatively required presentation of other program
types. Qualifying the effectiveness of the Commission's pursuit of these
goals is the device employed, the licensing power; for in each case the Com-
mission must weigh the advisability of having a station in being against the
conjectural deterrent effect on other potential offenders of license denial or
revocation. 26 Accordingly, for the comparative freedom from censorship at-
tained through limitation of regulation to the licensing weapon, the price is
less than complete control. 27 Justifying this incomplete control, however, is
the point that in a field where freedom is contrived, rather than assumed, it
is best sought slowly, on peril that it vanish in the contriving.2
Limitations on Licensees
Most indirect of the controls exerted over program content by the FCC
is that resulting from license denial on the ground that the public interest
will not be served by permitting the particular applicant to function as a
broadcaster.
25. Apparently content with the certainty that sponsors will insist on a sufficiency of
entertainment, the Commission has not concerned itself markedly with the problem except
to insure that stations are not licensed where no talent is available, see note 29 in! ra,
and to attempt to secure, through the Chain Broadcasting Regulations, competition for
the listening audience. See pp. 282-3 infra.
26. Far more frequently than it revokes a license or denies renewal, the Commission
merely warns. Thus, between 1934 and 1942, two licenses were revoked and' 13 applica-
tions for renewal denied. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Coiu-
merce on H.R. 5497, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 834 (1942). On applicants for unassigned
frequencies, of course, the Commission can be somewhat harsher.
27. Witness the plaintive remonstration of the Federal Radio Commission made
nineteen years ago but remarkably similar to FCC, PUBLIc SERVIcE RESPONSIBILITY ov
BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946) (the so-called "Blue Book"): ". . . broadcasting stations
are not given ... great privileges ... for the primary benefit of advertisers. Such
benefit as is derived by advertisers must be incidental and entirely secondary to the inter-
est of the public." 2 FRC ANN. REP. 168 (1928).
28. Probably quite desirable is the provision in S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14
(1947), empowering the Commission to issue cease and desist orders. Failing substantial




As its initial criterion in this field, the Commission requires that the ap-
plicant be familiar with the needs and resources of the community or region
he intends to serve and that the area be adapted to the type of service pro-
posed. In a large number of cases, failure to meet this standard has been
cited by the FCC as a bar to licensing,- although the recent Powel Crosley o
case casts doubt on the criterion's uniformity of application."1
Oligopoly being inevitable in the technology of radio, the Commission has
sought to prevent control of a number of stations by any one licensee 2 in
order to diversify as much as possible the points of view represented 3 and
to assure service appropriate to the area covered. While general awareness
of the policy's existence has doubtless caused some licensees to refrain from
seeking further franchises, it can scarcely be alleged that the Commission's
enforcement has been so vigorous as to preclude fraudulent attempts at
multiple ownership. Discovering misrepresentation as to ownership 34 after
issuing a license, the regulatory agency has invariably subordinated its anti-
monopoly policy to its desire for continued program service and let off the
miscreant with a warning. 35
29. See, e.g., Havens and Martin, Inc., 6 F.C.C. 237 (1938) (applicant unfamiliar
with district) ; Pacific Radio Corp., 6 F.C.C. 475 (1938) (insufficient talent available).
30. Powel Crosley, FCC Docket No. 6767 (July 7, 1945).
31. Transfer of WLW and 23 other licenses to the Aviation Corp. vas permitted
despite the fact that neither the president nor the board chairman of the transferee had
more than a listener's acquaintance with the requirements of service in the public interest.
Neither had so much as read the Communications Act. Apparently, transfer of the radio
licenses as part of a much larger transaction between Crosley and the Aviation Corp. was
decided upon only as an afterthought. See SxP!pmNx, op. cit. jispra note 2, at 167-83.
32. See, e.g., Louisville Times Co., 5 F.C.C. 554, 559 (1938). But note that one
licensee has been permitted to amass 23 licenses in varying fields. Powel Crosley, FCC
Docket No. 6767 (July 7, 1945).
33. "The Commission recognizes the . . . importance of avoiding monopoly of the
avenues of communicating fact and opinion to the public. All the Commissioners agree
to the general principle that diversification of control of such media is desirable.' FCC
Public Notice No. 72933, Jan. 13, 1944. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470, 474-5 (1940) ; FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
34. Spurred in many cases by the high degree of profitability of many licenses. Sev-
eral metropolitan stations have recently been sold for over $500,000. Smith, The Pcople's
Stake in Radio, 111 Nmv REPuBLic 11, 12 (July 3, 1944).
35. Panama City Broadcasting Co., 9 F.C.C. 208 (1942); Ocala Broadcasting Co., 9
F.C.C. 223 (1942); the "Texas Cases," 8 F.C.C. 445-S4 (1941). The Commission has
strangely been somewhat harsher in cases where misrepresentation of stock ownership or
payment has been made for purposes other than concealing unified control of several
licenses. Western Gateway Broadcasting Corp., 9 F.C.C. 92 (1942); WOKO, Inc., 10
F.C.C. 454 (1944), aff'd, 67 Sup. Ct. 213 (1946). The ruling in the former case may be
explained on the ground that while one application was denied another for the same
frequency was granted.
By denying licenses to applicants guilty of patently false statements, the Commission
maintains a remote control on program content, for supervision of content is based to a
great extent on the promises made and records kept by licensees; if these can be relied on
1947]
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Acting somewhat more emphatically, the FCC has sought to prevent con-
trol of local stations by network organizations. On investigation in 1938, the
Commission found that the networks had in many cases taken over virtually
complete control of the program policies of individual licensees and had con-
tractually bound the outlets in such fashion as to throttle any exercise of
local initiative.16 A series of regulations was accordingly issued, aimed at
freeing local stations from external control while simultaneously permitting
the continuation of chain organization for the purpose of sharing resources.37
Although sustained by the Supreme Court, 38 the Chain Broadcasting Reg-
ulations have been of questionable value in returning to the individual licen-
see complete responsibility for programming. So long as the networks are
able to perpetuate the present system of unitary sponsorship of nationwide
broadcasts, it appears that the consequent revenue 11 will persuade local out-
the Commission's task is simplified. See Western Gateway Broadcasting Corp., supra at
102;Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 338 (1941). But see FCC, PUBLIC
SERvIcE RESPONSIBLITY OF BROADCAsT LICENSEES 5 (1946).
36. See FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING (1941). For the purpose of this dis-
cussion, the evils discovered are best treated in terms of the remedies devised. See note 37
infra.
Symptomatic of the Commission's wonted caution to avoid charges of authoritarian-
ism is the fact that three years were spent in surveying the effects of chain broadcasting
on licensee competition for listeners and advertisers, when reference to NBC's standard
affiliation contract would have sufficiently documented most of the ultimate findings of
restraint. The contract is reprinted in RoBINSON, RADIO NTWORXS AND TIE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 253 (1943). At one juncture, investigation of the obvious permitted John
Royal, program director of NBC, to defend the proposition that despite his complete con-
trol over NBC's Red and Blue networks the two nonetheless competed. Transcript, pp.
644-7, Hearings on Chain Broadcasting, FCC Docket No. 5060 (1941).
37. The regulations provide that no license will be issued to a standard broadcast sta-
tion affiliated with a network by a contract which: (1) provides that the station shall not
broadcast programs of another network; (2) denies to any other station in the area the
privilege of broadcasting network programs not transmitted by the first station or which
prevents a station not serving the same area from broadcasting any network program;
(3) is of more than one year's duration; (4) grants the network an option on the sta-
tion's time in such fashion as to hinder the station's independent programming; or (5)
hinders the station in establishing rates for other than network programs. Moreover, net-
works are barred from owning two licenses in the same area or any license where owner-
ship by a network will reduce competition; and stations are denied licenses if they have
contracts with a network organization which operates two or more networks. 47 CoDE
FED. RyGs. § 3.101-8 (Cum. Supp. 1943), as amended, 47 CoDE FED. REGS. § 3.107 (Supp.
1943).
The last prohibition made necessary the sale by NBC of one of its networks, The
Blue, the weaker, was sold in October, 1943, to Edward J. Noble, licensee of WMCA
and, in 1945, became the American Broadcasting Co. WHITE, op. cit. sisprza note 1, at 40,
For criticism of the chain regulations, see ROBINSON, Op. cit. stpra note 36, at 202-71
Friedrich, The FCC "Monwpoly Report": A Critical Analysis, 4 PuB. OpiN. Q. 526
(1940) (based on the preliminary report).
38. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
39. The profitability of radio today is indicated by the increase in taxable profits for
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lets to follow voluntarily the practices the regulations prevent their agreeing
to contractually.
40
Further in aid of the anti-monopoly policy's objective of diversification
of points of view, the Commission has declined to license parties possessed
of known attitudes-e.g., religious groups and labor unions 41-where a less
obviously prejudiced applicant was available. While laudable in theory, this
over-all policy of giving paramount attention to the outward indicia of diver-
sified objectivity depends for practical validity on the extent to which the
individual broadcaster actually controls his programming and the fairness
with which he considers requests for time from groups over whom he has
been preferred by the Commission as probably less biased. Both of these
points will be examined later in this discussion.
42
The legitimacy of looking beneath an applicant's institutional label to
pre-evaluate his capacity to serve the public interest was before the Commis-
sion in WBNX Broadcasting Co.43 Along with fourteen other applicants, the
News Syndicate Co., publisher of the New York Daily Nws, requested as-
signment of one of four FM channels open in the New York area. The Amer-
ican Jewish Congress appeared at the hearings on the conflicting applications
to oppose the News' petition on the ground that "the consistent bias and
hostility displayed by the Daily News in its editorial and news columns
against Jews and Negroes" 44 rendered the newspaper unfit to act as the
trustee of the public interest.
all networks and stations from $23,837,944 in 1939 to "0,272,851 in 1944. More signifi-
cantly, in 1939, the ratio of taxable profit (per cent) to depreciated cost of broadcast
property was 67.1; in 1944, it was 222.6. FCC, PUnLIc Sunvics REsroNsMnzTr OF
BROADCAST Licmsmrs 49 (1946).
40. E.g., although, under the regulations, if a chain member refuses to accept a net-
work broadcast any other station in the area may take it, the number of instances of
exercise of this option is negligible. SIEPMANX, op. cit. supra note 2, at 225. "The Com-
mission labored greatly and brought forth a mouse." Ibid.
41. 3 FRC ANN. RP\,. 34 (1929) (over-all rationale for discrimination against special
interest groups); see Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F2d 244 (App. D.C. 1947);
Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. FRC, 105 F.2d 793 (App. D.C. 1939); Chicago Federa-
tion of Labor v. FRC, 41 F.2d 422 (App. D.C. 1930) (regarded by the FRC as raising
the "question whether it is in the public interest to give a cleared channel to an organiza-
tion ... to broadcast social doctrines of its owners." 3 FRC Ann. REP. 76 (1929).
Note, however, that in WBNX Broadcasting Co., Decision, p. 27, FCC Docket No.
6013 (Nov. 4, 1947), discussed infra, note 49, the Commission granted FMNf licenses to a
labor union and a religious group, abandoning its intention, announced earlier in the pro-
ceedings, to continue the discriminatory policy. WBNX Broadcasting Co., Proposed De-
cision, FCC Docket No. 6013 (Apr. 15, 1947). The move may, perhaps, be regarded as
belated recognition that "[t]he agencies of mass communication are big business and their
owners are big businessmen." Commission on FaR.Dom OF THE PRss, A FRE ATND RE-
siOxsmiLE PRESS 59 (1947).
42. See pp. 292-3, infra.
43. Decision, FCC Docket No. 6013 (Nov. 4, 1947).
44. AJC Memorandum in the Nature of Proposed Findings, p. 2, WBNX Broad-
casting Co., supra note 43.
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Introduced by the AJC in support of its contentions were a number of
editorial and news items which allegedly demonstrated anti-Semitic bias on
the part of the News, 4 and a content analysis comparing the number of items
"favorable" and "unfavorable" to Jews and Negroes appearing in the News
and four other New York newspapers. 4 Replying to the charges, the News
contended that constitutional and statutory provisions precluded any con-
sideration by the Commission of the material submitted and that, in any
case, the evidence introduced by the AJC did not substantiate its accusa-
tions.
41
In its decision, the FCC avoided the major issue presented by the con-
tending parties, striking the AJC's evidence on the grounds that the samples
offered were insufficient to demonstrate any consistent bias on the part of
the News and that the content analysis was lacking in reliability. 4 The news-
paper's license application was denied, however, the announced rationale
being that granting it would undesirably centralize control of New York's
communication media.49 While the Commission has lengthily investigated
45. Id. at 22-51.
46. Id. at 57-61. Regarded as"'favorable" mentions were achievements of individuals,
political or community activities, mention of persecution and discrimination, inter-group
good-will activities and "miscellaneous favorable." In the "unfavorable" category were
crimes, inter-group antagonisms and clashes and "miscellaneous unfavorable."
The AJC's fundamental finding was that the News had printed, over a sample period,
65 "favorable" stories concerning Jews or Negroes for every 35 "unfavorable," while the
average ratio of the other newspapers was 89-11. Limited to Negroes, the News ratio
was 45-55, with the average of the others again 89-11. Id. at 58.
47. See News Syndicate Co. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions, pp. 13-76,
WBNX Broadcasting Co., FCC Docket No. 6013 (Nov. 12, 1946).
48. WBNX Broadcasting Co., Memorandum Opinion, FCC Docket No. 6013 (April
9, 1947) (released June 13, 1947) ; aff'd, Decision (Nov. 4,, 1947). Commissioner Durr
dissented, pointing out that the majority was treating the matter as though the AJC bore
a burden of proof whereas actually its evidence was merely in aid of the Commission's de-
cision. Durr argued, moreover, that such News editorial statements as "Plenty of people
just now are exercising their rights to dislike the Jews" and "Not all German Jews were
profiteers" tended not only "'to show bias and prejudice but also a lack of that sense of
public responsibility which should be expected of a broadcast licensee." Id. at 7-8.
In the WHKC case, 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945), the FCC admitted in evidence a content
analysis offered by the United Automobile Workers to show that the station presented
biased commentators. See Stewart, Radio Commentators and Free Speech, 14 CommoN
SENsE 32 (Aug., 1945). And in United States v. Pelley, 132 F.2d 170 (1942), cert. denied,
318 U.S. 764 (1943), a content analysis was introduced at a criminal trial showing that of
1240 statements printed by a newspaper in 157 articles, 1195 were consistent with and sug-
gested copying from the 14 major Nazi propaganda themes. The analysis was held admissi-
ble "if only to show the background from which the intent might be better judged." Id.
at 181.
49. WBNX Broadcasting Co., Decision, p. 26, FCC Docket No. 6013 (Nov. 4, 1947).
On the same basis, the Commission denied the application of WLIB, Inc., owned by the
publisher of the N.Y. Post.
Of the four licenses granted, one was given to Unity Broadcasting Corp., organized
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the monopolistic effects of joint newspaper-radio ownership," the infre-
quency with which they are considered determinative a leads to the conjec-
ture that the AJC's intervention had tangible, if hidden, results. In any
event, remarks made at the hearings indicate that the members of the Com-
mission believed the controversy to be within their jurisdiction, 2 a point of
view thoroughly sustainable, it would appear, on the basis of the earlier
discussion of the statute and its interpretation.
More difficult among the questions raised by the News' case are the stand-
ards by which previous expressions of prejudice are to be judged and the
sufficiency of proof required. It would, to pursue the present example, seem
necessary flatly to deny licenses to applicants demonstrably guilty of de-
famatory attacks on the racial and religious groups comprising our pluralistic
democratic society, careful distinction being made between defamation and
reasoned, if unpopular, criticism. 3 It is far more in the public interest to
by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, and another to Radio Corp. of the
B oard of Missions and Church Extension of the Methodist Church. In doing so, the FCC
made clear that in metropolitan areas, where other adequate service is available, it is will-
ing to relax its general policy against licensing special interest groups, see p. 283 wtpra,
and will even prefer them to other applicants. WBNX Broadcasting Co., Decision, supra
at 27.
50. In furtherance of its anti-monopoly policy, the Commission investigated for three
years the advisability of permitting newspaper-radio joint ownership, FCC Order No. 79
(Mar. 20, 1941), concluding ultimately that newspaper ownership should not be a bar to
licensing, but that the possibility of creating a monopoly of information should be a factor
considered in acting on applications. FCC Public Notice No. 72933 (Jan. 13, 1944).
51. Approximately one-third of all standard stations are owned by press interests.
SiEsmmx, op. cit. supra note 2, at 130. And in allocation of FMf licenses, the Commis-
sion gave little indication, prior to the News case, that it intended to terminate the over-
lapping. KoNEcKY, MONOPOLY STF-Ls FM 11-2 (1946). Indeed, as pointed out by Com-
missioner Jett, ',VBNX Broadcasting Co., Decision, p. 29, FCC Docket No. 6013 (NOV.
4, 1947), the N.Y. Times had previously been given an FM license.
52. After consultation with the entire Commission, the presiding officer at the hear-
ing announced, "It seems to me that it is perfectly appropriate to enxamine into what the
applicant, who is a newspaper, does with his newspaper." Transcript of Record, p. 1411,
WBNX Broadcasting Co., FCC Docket No. 6013 (1947). See also id. at 279-40, 284,
287-8, 1412.
Collaterally, the News argued that to judge printed statements as indicative of their
publisher's capacity to serve the public interest is to circumscribe the freedom of the press.
The alternative, however, is to permit exploitation of a limited medium for a purpose un-
encompassed by the public interest, a consideration before which the "freedom" defense
would seem unavailing.
53. The line of distinction to be drawn is that which separates a Hitlerian attack on
Jews as a race from a critical appraisal of Judaism by an atheist. See statement by
Neville Miller, as National Association of Broadcasters president, that broadcasts "incit-
ing racial and religious hatred are an evil not to be tolerated." N.Y.Times, Dec. 23, 1938,
p. 4, col. 5; see LEE AND LEE, Tim FrNE ART OF PROPAGADA-A STUDY oF FATHEn
CouGHLIN's SPEECHES (1939); cf. Riesman, Democracy and Defamalion: Control of
Group Libel, 42 COL. L. R-v. 727 (1942).
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leave channels unoccupied than to permit their use by individuals whose
broadcasts would be subversive of the democratic ethic. As the News' case
made clear, however, the problem is not so much categorization of undesir-
ables as demonstration of their undesirability." No attempt was made by
the AJC to show that the News had consciously adopted a defamatory pol-
icy,55 and it may be doubted that such an attempt, if made, would have been
convincing. On this point, it may be suggested that the Commission weigh
carefully any evidence submitted to it, endeavoring, once a prima face case
has been presented, to investigate conclusively on its own motion."
Limitations on Program Content
Doubtless influenced by the Congressional denial of censorship powers,
the Commission has never indicated in broad terms its conception of pro-
gramming not in the public interest.57 Instead, relying on the statutory pro-
visions that make it the final judge of attempts by licensees to fulfill the re-
sponsibilities of their trusteeship, subject to judicial review only on points of
law, the FCC has sought negatively to define the standard of the public
interest by a series of ad hoc decisions.
The authority of the Commission to denominate programs not in the
public interest was first considered judicially in KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v.
54. See discussion of the WHKC and Pelley cases, supra note 48, for indication of a
possible technique. It seems unlikely, however, that Congressional establishment of a con-
tent analysis section in the FCC is imminent.
55. In none of its prepared statements did the AJC attempt the inference from alleged
instances of defamation of deliberate adoption of a defamatory attitude on the part of the
News. "It makes no difference whether the News has any such intent. It is the effect
of the policies of the News on its readers and its possible effect on the radio audience
which is in issue here." AJC Brief on Exceptions to Proposed Decision, p. 12, WBNX
Broadcasting Co., FCC Docket No. 6013 (June 19, 1947).
56. Under § 403 of the Communications Act. While the Commission is not over-
supplied with funds, this factor would seem to be outweighed by the undesirability of
being forced to return in effect a verdict of "not proven guilty" against the nation's
largest newspaper. N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 22, 1947, p. 2, col. 3.
57. A policy criticized in SIEPAIANN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 230, for keeping "radio
on tenterhooks as to when and where the next blow might fall." It might be argued, how-
ever, that such anxiety is unjustified in an industry where so few blows have fallen. See
note 26 supra.
On one occasion, former Chairman Prall informally announced as a definite policy
that certain types of programs were not in the public interest: (1) astrology; (2) solici-
tation of funds; (3) false, fraudulent and misleading advertisements; (4) fortune-telling;
(5) defamatory statements; (6) refusal to give equal opportunity for discussion of con-
troversial issues (but not, apparently, refusal to air them at all, see pp. 289-90 infra) ; (7)
obscenity and indecency; (8) programs offending religious sensibilities; (9) programs in
which the station favors particular viewpoints on political, religious or social issues; (10)
liquor advertisements; (11) "cliffhanger" programs for children; (12) interruption of
concerts for sponsor plugs; (13) excessive advertisements; (14) excessive use of
transcriptions. LANDRY, WHO, WHAT, WHY Is RADIO? 52 (1942).
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FRC,-8 where Dr. J. R. Brinkley challenged denial by the Federal Radio
Commission-the FCC's predecessor-of his application for license renewal.
Pointing out that Dr. Brinkley had employed his station largely as a means of
stimulating interest in his "goat-gland" operation for masculine rejuvena-
tion, and that he had prescribed remedies for ailing listeners on the basis of
written descriptions of their afflictions, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia found that such activities did not advance the public interest
so markedly as to require reversal of the Commission's ruling, as a matter
of law. More significantly, the court held that the agency had "merely ex-
ercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant's past conduct, which
is not censorship." "
Similarly, the Radio Commission was upheld in lifting the license of Sta-
tion KGEF, Los Angeles, owned by the Trinity Methodist Church, SouthcO
on the ground that its actual proprietor, a Rev. Dr. Shuler, had broadcast
attacks on judges, the local bar association, Jews and Catholics and had
threatened an unnamed man with radio disclosure of damaging information
unless a sizable contribution to the church were made immediately 0 ' On
the basis of these decisions, a number of other program types have been held
not in the public interest, including astrological predictions 02 and advice on
finance, love, marriage 63 and health.
4
It can scarcely be asserted, however, that all programs featuring char-
latanry, group defamation, or panaceas, psychical and physical, are barred
from the air.65 Rather, by singling out extreme instances, the FCC has
striven to impose minimal restraints on program content in terms of the
ethical and social tastes of the society, but, reluctant to face charges of
censorship, has waited for public expression of those tastes before proceed-
ing further.
Of more general deterrent effect are the twin rulings of the ayfloa , cr
58. 47 F2d 670 (App. D.C. 1931). Cf. Hammond-Calumet Broadcasting Corp., 2
F.C.C. 321 (1936).
59. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (App. D.C. 1931).
60. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (App. D.C. 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
61. Several contributions were shortly received. Trinity Methodist Church, South v.
FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 852 (App. D.C. 1932).
62. Adelaide Lillian Carrell, 7 F.C.C. 219, 222 (1939); Scroggin & Co. Bank, 1
F.C.C. 194, 195 (1935); T. Yount, 2 F.C.C. 200, 206 (1935).
63. Scroggin & Co. Bank, 1 F.C.C. 194, 195-6 (1935).
64. Bremer Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 79, 83 (1935). Specific program excesses
were also banned in United States Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. 208, 219 (1935) (programs
religious in character but commercialized) ; Bremer Broadcasting Co., mspra (broadcast in
code of racing results, code being sold at newsstands); and Cannon System, Ltd., 8
F.C.C. 207 (1940) (excessive use of transcriptions, semble).
65. All of the blame for presentation of extravagant claims for proprietary medicines
must not be placed on the licensee. Health organizations and medical societies have
demonstrated reluctance to cooperate with broadcasters by informing them of the validity
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case,66 decided in 1941, that "a broadcaster cannot be an advocate" 6 -in
the instant case, of political candidates-and must, when public issues are
discussed, present all sides fairly and equally." With the exception of those
who protest the Commission's assertion of powers of review over program
content, few may be found to attack the latter ruling, for it is in direct ac-
cord with the FCC's original intervention in the field to assure the widest
circulation of contending viewpoints. 9 Widespread criticism of the ban on
editorial comment- by the licensee has, however, caused the FCC to schedule
hearings for the early part of next year to reconsider the question."
The case for allowing editorializing contends first that broadcasters are
incapable of personal objectivity, that their bias is reflected to some degree
in their programs,7' and that the public can best evaluate programs when
it is informed of the broadcaster's own stand. It is argued, moreover, that
the objectives of the FCC's control over program content are satisfied once
equality of treatment has been assured and that further control is unwar-
ranted interference with free expression.
In rejoinder, however, may be urged the undesirability of letting the licen-
see pose as an authority on all issues against whatever opponents he may
produce, while still claiming that all points of view are fairly and equally
presented. Furthermore, to allow freedom of expression to licensees subor-
dinate in great measure to advertising interests 2 would probably assure
over-emphasis of the point of view of those interests. In view of the abun-
dant evidence demonstrating that, despite the impartiality requirement of
the Mayflower doctrine, that point of view is already over-emphasized by
broadcasters in news and commentary programs, 3 lending its presentation
of the claims. See address by Nathan Straus, president of WMCA, New York, reported
in N. Y. Times, June 3, 1945, sec. 2, p. 5, col. 5.
66. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941) ; cf. Bellingham Broadcast-
ing Co., 8 F.C.C. 159, 171-2 (1940) ; 2 FRC ANN. REP. 152 (1928).
67. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941).
68. Although the decision stated, at 340, that "the licensee has . . . the obligation of
presenting all sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively and without bias
* . . ," it fell far short of the definite affirmative requirement of the Scott case, see pp.
289-90 in fra, that the licensee arrange for discussion of leading issues.
69. See pp. 279-80 supra.
70. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Order, FCC Docket No. 8516 (Sept. 5,
1947).
71. See note 73 infra.
72. See p. 292 infra.
73. Sussman, How Radio Treated Labor in the Elections, 14 CoMmoN SErsn 34
(March, 1945); Stewart, Radio Commentators and Free Speech, 14 CoxmmoN SENSE 32
(Aug., 1945). See CHASE, SOUND AND FURY 128-9 (1942). Superficial compliance, until
recently, has been complete. Broadcasting, Jan. 20, 1947, p. 13, col. 1.
Two years ago, Variety, flippant but authoritative trade magazine, estimated the
qualifications of 30 leading news commentators and analysts. Six were found sufficiently
trained to be "general analysts," four qualified in limited capacities, eight were regarded
as adequate reporters. Comments on the balance ranged from "excellent sports reporter"
[VCol. 57: 215
RADIO PROGRAM CONTROLS
additional strength through official sanction seems altogether unjustified 4
Affirmative Requirements of Program Schedules
Apparently dissatisfied with the results obtained from limitations on licen-
sees and negative restraints on program content, the Commission has, during
the last two years, reversed its emphasis and enunciated the rudiments of
an affirmative concept of service in the public interest.
The first clear-cut indication of the new policy was the decision in the
WHKC case in June, 1945. 7 The station, on the ground that discussion of
labor affairs was "controversial" and, accordingly, not suited to broadcast-
ing on a sponsored program, 71 stringently censored remarks scheduled to be
made on a. United Automobile Workers program. Averring that considera-
tion of organized labor was in the public interest under the circumstances,
the UAW petitioned the FCC for revocation of the station's license. Upon
request of both parties, the Commission dismissed the action, WHKC hav-
ing promised the labor group a reasonable opportunity to be heard. In its
order, however, the regulatory agency denounced refusal to air labor discus-
sions on the basis of their "controversial" nature, and indicated that sched-
uling of programs devoted to public issues, "controversial" or othervise, is
required of licensees by the public interest.7
Additional emphasis was given this position in Petition of R. H. Scott, 8
to "unlimited contacts with reactionary legislators and big business lobbyists in Washing-
ton." Variety, July 25, 1945, pp. 26, 30.
Perhaps the only possible solution to the problem of obtaining equal treatment in
news and analysis is for each network to collect a group of qualified commentators, repre-
sentative of all points of view, and present them at times of equal listener value. Even this
method, however, would depend for success on the willingness of local outlets to accept
all the programs. For unaffiliated licensees, there seems no alternative to attempting fair
treatment.
74. But see, apparently, statement by the Commission on Freedom of the Press, re-
printed in WHirm, op. cit. spra note 1, at v-x.
75. United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945). Indicative of the turmoil stirring
in the FCC was the announcement two months earlier of "a policy of more detailed re-
view of broadcast station performance when passing upon applications for license re-
newals." FCC News Release No. 81575 (Apr. 10, 1945).
76. ,VHkC was acting in accord with its interpretation of the Standards of Practice
announced by the National Association of Broadcasters in 1939, which barred sale of time
for discussion of controversial issues with the exception of political broadcasts. The
rationale for this policy lay allegedly in the NAB's fear that sale of time would permit
monopolization of the air by those able to pay for it.
The station's case was punctured by a content analysis which demonstrated that
Fulton Lewis, Jr., news commentator on a sponsored program, was consistently guilty of
anti-labor bias. See Stewart, Radio Commentators and Free Speech, 14 CoMs oir Sz2;s
32 (Aug., 1945).
77. Two months later, the NAB code provision was dropped. Variety, Aug. 8, 1945,
p. 31, col. 5.
78. Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC Release No. 96050 (July 19, 1946).
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where petitioner, an atheist, asked revocation of the licenses of three Cali-
fornia stations for refusing him time to reply to attacks made on his beliefs
on regularly scheduled religious programs. Although denying the petition,
the Commission brushed aside the licensees' argument that airing of Scott's
views would not be in the public interest inasmuch as they were distasteful
to the great part of the listening audience. "The criterion of the public in-
terest," the FCC warned, ". . . clearly precludes a policy of making radio
wholly unavailable as a medium for the expression of any view which
falls within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 11
It would accordingly appear that the Commission is determined that radio
shall serve as an instrument for the diffusion of ideas legitimately in dispute,
regardless of the attitude of the broadcasters toward their propriety, a posi-
tion wholly consistent with the agency's over-all concept of radio's proper
function in a democratic society.
To implement its new, affirmative thesis of its responsibility for regulation
keyed to this function, the Commission was studying on a broad front,
during 1945-6, the degree to which radio had achieved its potential. The
study disclosed widespread failure on the part of the industry to meet mini-
ral. requirements of its public service responsibility. Many listeners had
been driven from their receiving sets by the tawdry, protracted nature of
much advertising continuity8 0 Local material, if not eliminated entirely,
had been relegated to the hours when most listeners were asleep or working.81
Sustaining programs, primary vehicles of education and of experimentation
in new aspects of radio programming, had similarly been actually or effec-
tively banished8 2 Local stations had yielded their programming function to
79. Id. at 5. Only one of the stations, KQW, has since given Scott time, and that on
only one occasion. Communication to the Yale Law Journal from Dow, Lohnes and
Albertson, Sept. 5, 1947. Complying with the FCC's ruling, the stations have denied
Scott's requests by asserting that the existence of a deity is far down on their list of
controversial questions demanding discussion. Letter to R. H. Scott from the Don Lee
Broadcasting System, October 24, 1946. The Commission is now considering a second
Scott petition demanding revocation of the licenses of four stations on the ground that
this priority allocation is not in the public interest. Petition of R. H. Scott, filed Mar. 7,
1947.
80. FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 40-7 (1946)
(hereinafter the Blue Book). Cited were excessive number and length of commercials
(one station broadcast an average of 16.7 spot announcements per hour over the course of
a week, while another regularly aired five uninterrupted minutes of sponsors' messages) ;
insufficient time between commercials; interruption of programs for middle coqimercials
(particularly news programs, with the news dangled as bait to sustain the listener through
the plug); subversion of patriotic themes to commercial purposes; physiological com-
mercials; propaganda in commercials; and intermixture of programs and advertising.
81. Blue Book 38. And see SIEPMANN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 19-23, for an analysis
of the radio resources of a sample community and their non-utilization.
82. Blue Book 12-36. The Commission regards sustaining programs as essential to
assure balanced programming, to air features inappropriate to sponsorship, to cover




networks s3 and networks had in turn surrendered their prerogatives to ad-
vertising agencies, 4 all to the end that highly lucrative, 5 nationally spon-
sored programs might be presented.
Disclosing the details of the study in its Blue Book of last year, the Com-
mission asserted that failure of the industry on these counts was abusive of
its responsibility to the public interest. Accordingly, the Commission an-
nounced that:
"In issuing and in renewing the licenses of broadcast stations,
the Commission proposes to give particular consideration to four
program service factors relevant to the public interest. These are:
(1) the carrying of sustaining programs, including network sustain-
ing programs, with particular reference to the retention by licensees
of a proper discretion and responsibility for maintaining a well-
balanced program structure; (2) the carrying of local live programs;
(3) the carrying of programs devoted to the discussion of public
issues, and (4) the elimination of advertising excesses." Sr
83. "The most immediately profitable way to run a station, may be to procure a net-
spot announcements, and to substitute spot announcements and phonograph records for
grams throughout the day-interrupting the network output only to insert commercial
spot announcements, and to substitute spot announcements and phonograph records for
outstanding network sustaining programs. The record on renewal, since April, 1945, of
standard broadcast stations shows that some stations are approaching perilously close to
this extreme?' Bhe Book 39.
84. Blue Book 18. Instead of the network determining in advance the composition of
its broadcast day, planning all programs itself and then offering the shows to sponsors,
programs originate with the advertising agencies and time for their presentation is then
bought from the networks. ... . iT]he broadcasting company sells Time. It owns the
air. It will sell you a piece. Period." Norman Rosten, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1945, sec. 2,
p. 5, col. 1. See CoMMIssION ON FREEDoM OF THE PaRss, A Fans AND R.srOms LE PnEss
63-4 (1947).
The Commission on Freedom of the Press recommends that networks and licensees
separate programs from commercials, selling only unrelated advertising time surrounding
uninterrupted programs. Failing voluntary action, the Commission suggests adoption of
the practice as a standard of service in the public interest by the FCC. Printed in Wnmmz
op. ct. nipra note 1, at viii-ix. Seemingly, there could be no objection under § 326, for no
direct censorship is involved; § 310, which bars transfer of control of a station without the
FCC's approval, might well offer affirmative authority. United States Broadcasting
Corp., 2 F.C.C. 208, 224 (1935) (sale of one hour weekly to an individual, to be pro-
grammed and resold under his direction, held a violation of § 310). In view: of the inter-
dependence of sponsors and licensees, however, the possibility of securing arms-length
bargaining in this fashion seems slight.
Within the advertising agencies, it appears that monopolistic controls are developing.
In 1944, 38% of CBS business was handled by four agencies, 37% of ABC's business
came from a like number and for Mutual the figure vwas 31%. Brto.mncAsTrxo Y.Anw O-
30, 32 (1945). Fewer than 150 advertisers are responsible for all but 3-4% of network in-
come. CommissioN oN FRmDOM OF THE PREss, op. cit. supra, at 63.
85. See note 39 vtpra.
86. Bite Book 55.
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Of the necessity for the policy thus enunciated, the Blue Book leaves little
doubt. But it can scarcely be alleged that through this announcement of
future policy the defections of the licensees have been or will be entirely
cured87 Indeed, the observation has been authoritatively made that since
the Blue Book's appearance program quality has deteriorated still farther.81
While so extreme a statement may be questioned, it serves to point up the
fact that government regulation alone, whether negative or affirmative in
character, cannot afford a complete solution to the problem of securing a
radio industry that is a fit component of a democratic society.
CONTROL BY LICENSEES
Responsibility for initial determination of program content is in the licen-
see as trustee in the public interest. Aware of the supplemental nature of
its power, the FCC has only acted when the licensee has failed in his respon-
sibility. Accordingly, evaluation must be made of the attempt by the broad-
casters at fulfillment of their trust, and an appraisal attempted of the causes
of defection.
Each of the major networks has a code of program policies, as do the great
majority of the local stations, " most based on the theory that "radio enter-
ing the home and the family circle thereby incurs certain specific obliga-
tions." '0 As a result of the establishment of these standards, the more soci-
ally objectionable practices which characterized early radio have disap-
peared.
Contemporary criticism of the exercise by the licensees of their trust is,
accordingly, more in terms of what they fail to do than what is done im-
properly, a point confirmed by the affirmative policies recently introduced
by the FCC. Primarily responsible for the faults of omission, the Blue Book
makes clear, is the lucrative reward of the sponsored program; for to sell time
to advertisers licensees have permitted them to dictate program hours and
content.9
87. Note the substantial similarity of the Blue Book policy to that announced in Great
Lakes Broadcasting Co., FRC Docket No. 4900, quoted in 3 FRC ANN. REP. 32-5
(1929).
88. WHIrE, op. cit. slupra note 1, at 194.
89. "Standards of Practice" are formulated for its approximately 900 member stations
by the National Association of Broadcasters. The code, usually revised biennially, sets
reasonably high standards for program content, see text of proposed code, N.Y.Times,
Sept. 16, 1947, p. 18, col. 2, the members apparently feeling free to approve in view of the
total lack of enforcement procedures.
90. NBC, PROGRAM POLICIES AND WORKING MANUAL 9 (1943). The sound economic
basis for this courtesy is the unwillingness of broadcasters to offend listeners and of
sponsors to offend potential purchasers of sponsored products. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF
THE PRFSs, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PREss 73 (1947). In great measure, this policy has
also been responsible for the suppression of discussion of "controversial" issues. See p.
223 infra.
91. As pointed out in note 84 supra, the programs generally originate with the adver-
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Surrender of the programming capacity in this fashion has led not only
to the breaches of trust itemized in the Blue Book but, on the aesthetic side,
by making the profit-bent advertiser the judge of whether a program is to
be aired, has placed a premium upon the already-successful, 2 thereby frus-
trating the development of higher standards of listener taste.
More subtle, if equally regrettable, is the power of direct censorship of
points of view exercised by sponsors, epitomized by the discontinuance, in
1935, of Alexander Woollcott's programs because he had criticized Hitler
and Mussolini.93 And, whether to appease sponsors or in an attempt to be
so completely innocuous as to avoid offending any listener, licensees 0 4 have
de-emphasized broadcasting of "controversial" issues, 5 a policy whose effects
the FCC's mandates can only partially ameliorate.20
Admittedly, the networks and some local stations make an effort to pre-
sent public service and sustaining programs with some regularity, many
tising agency representing the sponsor. 'Many sponsors, however, exercise comparatively
direct control over their programs-a control difficult to justify in terms of their expertise
in serving the public. See LANDRY, WHo, WHAT, WHY Is RAmio? 43 (1942) (G.W.
Hill, American Tobacco Co. president, directing orchestra's tempo); EmST AND
LrmEy, THE CzxsoR MARcHEs O2 116 (1940) (Maxine Sullivan dropped for swinging
"Loch Lomond"); LANDRY, op. cit. supra, at 40 ("Smoke Gets in Your Eyes" barred by
cigarette firm).
92. Witness the presentation by NBC in September, 1945, of 19 "soap operas" daily;
CBS aired 17. Bhw Book 13. Advertiser domination is also succeeding, apparently, in
stiffing any possibility of creative improvement in radio by driving the best talent to other
fields. See Variety, June 20, 1945, p. 25, col. 3.
93. Blue Book 17. The purported reason for Woollcott's discharge was the sponsor's
fear that he would antagonize some listeners. The issue is difficult to resolve, but it is
possible that censorship of this type is more the result of the sponsor's personal prejudices
than of fear of alienating the audience.
Perhaps the high point in this type of censorship was reached when Chicago's base-
ball teams contracted for broadcasting of their games with the proviso that all comments
on the games would be favorable and no criticism of players or umpires would be voiced.
KASsNER AND ZAcHARoFF, RADio Is CENsoEo 136 (1936).
94. Broadcasters are also careful of their own sensibilities. Thus, Fred Allen vas
recently cut off the air for humorous sallies at NBC's vice-presidents, Variety, Apr. 23,
1947, p. 1, col. 1; and WLV, Cincinnati, on the occasion of a strike by its employees,
barred all mention of strikes on its programs. KAssxER AND ZAcHAOFF, RADIO Is Csx-
soaREl 19 (1936).
95. Regularly regarded as "controversial" have been labor and cooperative move-
ments. See SmPmAwx, op. cit. supra note 2, at 100-15; WHrrzi op. cit. smpra note 1, at
77-S0. Seemingly, this attitude could scarcely be motivated by great fear of public re-
action; consideration of the feelings of sponsors and licensees themselves is a more likely
cause. See ARCHER, BIG BuSINESS AND RAvio (1939) for a study of the corporate con-
trol of radio.
96. See note 79 supra.
97. See Bryson and Rowden, Radio as an Agency of Natiotal Unity, 244 A.u, .s
137 (1946). In the case of the network, the effort is often wasted, for many outlets sub-
stitute local commercial programs for the network offerings. Blue Book 32-6.
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being of outstanding quality. But the licensee has, on the whole, substan-
tially abandoned the control over program content which the regulatory
scheme postulates in him, transferring his responsibility to the advertiser.
On the principles set out in the Blue Book and the WHTKC and Scott deci-
sions, the FCC has moved to require reassumption of that trust by the
broadcaster. Short of enforcement of the new regulations with an unprece-
dented and unanticipated vigor, or statutory amendment to limit the profit-
ability of radio, however, it can hardly be expected that broadcasters will
in the near future reassert control of their own franchises in any great meas-
ure.
CONTROL BY THE PUBLIC
From a consideration of the controls imposed on program content by the
FCC, it is apparent that there is little endeavor on the part of the regulatory
agency to secure maximum attainment by radio of its potential as the so-
ciety's most efficient agency of information dissemination. Instead, the FCC
limits itself to mild, indirect regulation, most effective in aberrational situa-
tions. Quite probably, no government agency could set higher standards,
for the effectiveness of radio's use as an affirmative instrument of democracy
depends ultimately on the willingness of the people to listen to what is broad-
cast.
The evidence is strong that the listening audience likes radio the way it
is." Such evidence must be weighed against the fact that the public is usually
unaware of any standard against which program service can be matched "
-acceptance of a seeming gift 100 can scarcely be the measure of satisfaction
in the absence of any alternative. But the recent, speedy demise of a Wash-
ington, D.C., station which sought to feature information and discussion as
opposed to stereotyped entertainment 101 gives warning that any attempt at
a quick shift in emphasis in radio is doomed.
Yet the need for attainment by radio of its potential in terms of informa-
tion service is obvious. Representative, democratic government hypothesizes
an electorate jealous of its freedom and possessed of information sufficient
to make its policy decisions. Apparently, however, theoretical recognition
of these conditions far exceeds their operational significance. Liberty is not
98. See LAZARFELD AND FIELD, THIE PEOPLE LooK AT RADIO (1946), an analysis by
Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research of data secured by The Na-
tional Opinion Research Center.
99. ". . . [A] survey like the present one cannot tell what people would like if they
had the opportunity to listen to different radio fare." Id. at 12. Cf. Borneman, The Pub-
lic Opinion Myth, 195 HARPERs 30 (July, 1947).
100. Radio service can scarcely be regarded as entirely gratuitous when advertisers
spend an estimated $.02 per day per receiver to transmit their messages and listeners
spend approximately $.031 daily per receiver to hear the programs, Blue Book 54.
101. See Variety, July 23, 1947, p. 29, col. 5, "Blue Book Station (WQQW) Folds in
Failure of Longhair Policy."
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widely understood where only 58% of the people would permit the Socialist
Party to publish a newspaper and one-third would bar the press from crit-
icizing the American form of government. 10 2 Equally, the ability of an elec-
torate to make informed decisions may be challenged when only 7% of its
members know the meaning of the veto power in the United Nations mechan-
ism and fewer than two-thirds can identify the majority party in Congress.
03
To make freedom familiar and to fill in areas of popular ignorance, radio
can be invaluable. From civic groups 104 and educational institutions,105 lead-
ership must come to take advantage of the increased opportunities afforded
by the Blue Book requirements and the expansion of broadcast service
through FM. 11' To exploit the advantages thus gained, expansion of radio
criticism from its present impotent state 10 7 and development of radio listener
councils 10s are necessary.
If we assume the creation of a public thus made slightly aware of the op-
portunity which is radio, attention can be turned to the problems raised by
102. 10 PuB. OPIN. Q. 248 (1946). Equally may be cited the approval 53% of the
franchised voters in the poll-tax states give to continuation of the restricted ballot And
the nationwide tally shows only a 2-1 vote against the tax. Gallup poll figures printed in
LYDGATE; WHAT AMERIcA THIxNs 127 (1944). Compare the opinion of a majority of
Americans that 12 of 17 national or religious groups are either "not quite as good as we
are in major respects" or "definitely inferior." Id. at 61.
103. Unpublished data gathered by the American Institute of Public Opinion. The
Institute's release of Jan. 10, 1947, shows that shortly prior to the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act, only one-fifth of the public had any idea of the provisions of its predecessor,
the Wagner Act. Note that the degree to which Congress legislates in accordance with
public opinion apparently depends directly on the measure of familiarity of the public with
pending legislation. Topkis, How Bad Is Congress? 62 PoL Sci. Q. 531 (1947). See
Van Loon, Radio and Bctter City Goz'ernmet, 2 Pun. OPiN. Q. 110 (1938). Consider
the problem raised when Congress deliberately denies to the public the information neces-
sary to the formulation of reasonable opinions. See Newman, Control of Information
Relating to Atomic Energy, 56 YAiE L. J. 769 (1947).
104. An indication of the possible benefits to be gained from action by civc groups
both in securing licenses and in producing programs may be gained from Nochels,
Labor's Experience in Radio, 44 Ammn. FEanAaTioNxsT 276 (1937).
105. In the period 1921-36, 202 AM licenses were granted to educational institutions,
of which 29 remain, the casualties being attributable to faculty disinterest and insufficient
funds. Of the greater universities, Yale, Harvard and Chicago have never sought licenses.
WHIrE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 101-2, 111. See FRn aociR, RADIoBn.OADCASTUo AND
HiGHER EDucAToIN (Harvard Studies in Control of Radio No. 4, 1942).
106. For discussion of the opportunity opened to institutions of higher learning by FM,
see U.S. OICE OF EDUCATION, FM FOR EDUCATION (1944).
107. For this improvement, cooperation from the press is essential. Hitherto denied
from a natural disinclination to aid a competing medium and for fear of alienating spon-
sors of criticized programs, it may be secured through sufficient public demand. See
Landry, Wanted: Radio Critics, 4 PuB. Opi. Q 620 (1940). But cf. Siepmann, Further
Thoughts on Radio Criticism, 5 PuR. OPIN. Q. 308 (1941).
108. Councils in Cleveland, Ohio, and Madison, Wis., are valuable in conveying to
broadcasters the wishes of the generally inarticulate public, in publicizing programs and
in conducting research on public tastes and attitudes. Blue Book 55.
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the Mayflower and Scott cases. Councils and critics can call public attention
to broadcasters' bias, documenting their charges with competent content
analyses.' Interest can be stimulated in the use of radio as a source of in-
formation and "controversial" issues discussed despite sponsors' prejudices.
For, desirous of appealing to the potential purchasers of products advertised
on their frequencies, broadcasters will bar from the air any program deemed
unworthy by the public, will offer any for which there is expressed demand,
far more readily and efficiently than they will heed any requirement or pro-
hibition of the FCC.
The answer, then, as so frequently in our society, is in the public and the
institutions from which that public expects leadership. The process can be
a cumulative one, radio coming to serve increasingly in the public interest
as the public becomes interested. There can be no guarantee that radio will
be able to dispel the serious doubt cast by the increasing complexity of so-
cietal organization on the ability of the individual member to accumulate
sufficient information to make valid policy decisions. 10 Yet little pleasure
can be derived from contemplation of radio's demonstrated alternative talent
for furnishing an escape from that complexity.
109. See note 48 supra. Still another possibility for the use of content analysis is in
laying bare the stereotypes in which radio deals, in demonstrating its adherence to certain
fixed conceptions concerning component parts of our society. Note the recent charge that
on soap operas lawyers are invariably presented as shysters. N.Y. Post, Sept. 25, 1947, p.
30, col. 4-5. There is evidence that insofar as the Negro, at least, is concerned, radio's
record is better than that of other media of communication. See 13 J. Nr.O EDue. 382-6
(1944).
110. See LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINON (1922).
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